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Abstract
Background: The Philippines decentralized government health services through devolution to local governments
in 1992. Over the years, opinions varied on the impact of devolved governance to decision-making for local health
services. The objective of this study was to analyze decision-makers’ perspectives on who should be making
decisions for local health services and on their preferred structure of health service governance should they be able
to change the situation.
Methods: We employed a mixed methods approach that included an online survey in one region and in-depth
interviews with purposively-selected decision-makers in the Philippine health system. Study participants were asked
about their perspectives on decision-making in the functions of planning, health financing, resource management,
human resources for health, health service delivery, and data management and monitoring. Analysis of survey
results through visualization of data on charts was complemented by the themes that emerged from the
qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews based on the Framework Method.
Results: We received 24 online survey responses and interviewed 27 other decision-makers. Survey respondents
expressed a preference to shift decision-making away from the local politician in favor of the local health officer in
five functions. Most survey participants also preferred re-centralization. Analysis of the interviews suggested that the
preferences expressed were likely driven by an expectation that re-centralization would provide a solution to the
perceived politicization in decision-making and the reliance of local governments on central support.
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Conclusions: Rather than re-centralize the health system, one policy option for consideration for the Philippines
would be to maintain devolution but with a revitalized role for the central level to maintain oversight over local
governments and regulate their decision-making for the functions. Decentralization, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, must not only transfer decision-making responsibility to local levels but also ensure that those granted
with the decision space could perform decision-making with adequate capacities and could grasp the importance
of health services.
Keywords: Decentralization, Decision making, Health policy, Mixed methods, Philippines, Public health
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Background
Decentralization of health services, particularly in the
form of devolution of authority to local governments [1],
has been implemented in many countries motivated by
the expectation that it will empower local decision-
makers to oversee and steer their own health services
[2]. Yet beyond a few studies of selected disease-specific
programs where decentralization resulted in better
health outcomes [3, 4], decentralization’s effectiveness in
improving outcomes related to the broader dimension of
health system performance is uncertain based on the
limited number of reviews that examined the global evi-
dence [5–7]. On the other hand, the fact that local
decision-makers are granted the “decision space” [8, 9],
which provides an idea of the extent of choices available
to them, and are able to make decisions for the func-
tions of local health services because of decentralization
may already be a desired outcome in itself. Therefore,
when analyzing the effectiveness of decentralization, it is
important to take into account the perspectives of local
decision-makers themselves—how they perceive and
utilize their decision space in relation to other system
actors, as well as how they might want to modify the
decentralized structure of governance of health services
given their experience in navigating the system. This
study was driven by such a desire to examine the per-
spectives of decision-makers in the Philippines where
government health services were decentralized through
devolution to local governments since 1992 [10, 11].
These local governments enjoy a level of autonomy from
the central government and are comprised of provinces
and, within these, the municipalities and cities.
A number of studies, drawing from the decision space
framework, have assessed the extent of autonomy
enjoyed by local decision-makers in countries that have
decentralized or devolved their health systems [12–17].
Most have attempted to come up with an overall or
summative assessment of local decision space yet, in
practice, decision-making for health services often in-
volve multiple actors, each of whom may be wielding
varying degrees of influence into the decision-making
process. Thus, we have previously deconstructed local
decision space qualitatively between politicians and
health managers (i.e. political and technical decision-
makers) in the Philippines and concluded that the lat-
ter’s decision space for various functions was narrower
than the former’s [18]. It is therefore policy-relevant to
examine whether or not decision-makers in the
Philippines would prefer to shift the extent of decision
space available between types of decision-makers in
order to improve decision-making for local health ser-
vices, defined as the range of healthcare services (i.e.
promotive, preventive, curative, and rehabilitative) being
provided in local health facilities.
Despite more than two decades of efforts to evolve to-
wards more decentralized operations in the Philippines,
there has been no clear evidence in the peer-reviewed
literature on whether or not and to what degree devolu-
tion has influenced health system performance. Never-
theless, a lot has changed in the Philippines: the
population grew to 105 million in 2017 from only 62
million in 1990; life expectancy at birth increased to 69.1
in 2016 compared to 65.3 in 1990; cardiovascular dis-
eases became the leading cause of mortality by 2014
while infectious diseases like pneumonia ranked fourth;
infant mortality rate in 2016 was down to 21.5 per 1000
compared to 40.8 in 1990 [19]. Yet there still remains a
divergence of positions in the Philippines between those,
on one side, who desire to expand decentralization even
further by granting local governments greater control
(i.e. wider decision space) over financial resources to
better support local health facilities [20] and those, on
the other side, who want the central government to re-
take ownership and management of local health facilities
by reversing devolution and re-centralizing the system
[21, 22]. To our knowledge, no other study in the peer-
reviewed literature has explored on which side of this
divergence local decision-makers in the Philippines actu-
ally stand—i.e., whether they prefer to maintain the sta-
tus quo, or prefer to change the current structure of
governance. As mentioned, the evidence for decentral-
ization’s effectiveness is mixed, and so it remains to be
seen which between a more decentralized or a more
centralized structure of governance would improve
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health system performance. However, if decentralization
is indeed about enabling localities to have a say on how
decisions for health services are made, it is important to
ensure that the views of local decision-makers them-
selves, who are most familiar with the issues surround-
ing health service decentralization at local levels, are
considered.
Thus, the objective of this study was to analyze the
perspectives of local decision-makers in one region in
the Philippines on who should be making decisions for
health service functions at local levels, as well as their
preferences for the decentralized governance structure
of health services. This study aimed to further analyze
the preferences by triangulating these with the perspec-
tives of decision-makers representing various levels of
governance in the Philippine health system.
Methods
Mixed methods approach
This study employed a mixed methods approach. We
were guided by the Framework Method [23] of qualita-
tive health research, which involved the steps of tran-
scription, familiarization with the interviews, coding,
developing and applying an analytical framework, and
charting and interpreting the data. We developed an
interview guide that allowed in-depth exploration of
how decision-makers make decisions for selected health
service functions (described later), including their flexi-
bility in decision-making for each function to estimate
their decision space, and the various local actors whom
they perceived to be involved in decision-making. This
interview guide was previously published [18].
For the quantitative approach, an online survey ex-
plored decision-makers’ understanding of devolution,
their opinion on its benefits to the delivery of health ser-
vices, as well as their perceived challenges in its imple-
mentation. There was a two-step approach in the survey
to inquire about decision-making for each function, such
that a question first asked the respondents to identify
who among local decision-makers they perceived to have
the widest decision space (i.e. exerts the most influence
over decision-making for that particular function). This
was followed by a question that asked them to identify
whom they would rather prefer to be influencing the de-
cisions instead. A copy of the survey questionnaire is
provided as an online supplement (see Additional file 1).
The survey questionnaire then asked respondents for
their preferred governance structure of the health sys-
tem—i.e., whether they would prefer to maintain the
current devolved system, or would prefer to modify the
governance structure by adopting options for re-
centralization. Responses were collected through Google
Forms (https://www.google.com/forms/about/).
Decision-makers
We performed the in-depth interviews face-to-face with
up to 27 decision-makers in 2017 who were purposively-
selected to represent different levels of decision-making,
institutional affiliations, and geographical settings in the
Philippine health system. The profiles of these 27
decision-makers [18] and a selection of quotes from our
interviews with them [24] were published elsewhere. It
was at the 27th interview when saturation [25] was
judged to have been achieved, or the point when new in-
formation was no longer emerging. Saturation likewise
ensured that the themes identified in the analysis were
recurring rather than isolated themes. The interviews
lasted 1 h on average and were transcribed in Microsoft
Word 2016 in preparation for qualitative analysis.
We then performed the online survey for local
decision-makers in the region of Northern Luzon in the
Philippines. The region was selected out of convenience
because of the first author’s (HJL) contacts with key offi-
cials of the Department (i.e. Ministry) of Health (DOH)
regional office who supported this study and provided
access to records. Northern Luzon is composed of the
four provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and
Pangasinan, together with the 116 municipalities and
nine cities within these provinces, and has a combined
population of five million [26]. We defined a “decision-
maker” for this study as someone who is in a position,
whether elected (i.e. political) or appointed/career (i.e.
technical), who participates in performing six selected
health service functions. Following this definition, we
targeted the following groups of local decision-makers
and obtained a list of their email addresses from the
DOH regional office:
a) Technical: DOH regional office staff deployed to the
various local governments in the region to provide
technical assistance (e.g. “Development
Management Officers” or DMOs, “Public Health
Associates” or PHAs, “Nurse Deployment Program”
or NDP nurses, and medical doctors under the
“Doctors to the Barrios” (DTTB) program;
b) Political: Elected officials who head the local
governments (e.g. provincial governors, municipal
and city mayors, and other local politicians); and
c) Technical: Local health managers employed by the
local governments to supervise and manage health
services (e.g. provincial, municipal, and city health
officers who are also medical doctors).
The online survey questionnaire was sent to the 682
email addresses in the list. There were 153 emails that
bounced back or failed to deliver, resulting in a total of
529 valid emails for follow-up. Email reminders were
sent at least twice during a three-month period in 2018.
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In the end, we received 24 responses, or a response rate
of 4.5%. Figure 1 provides a summary of the number of
respondents for the quantitative approach (online sur-
vey) and the qualitative approach (in-depth interviews)
(Fig. 1).
Health service functions
The analytical framework was based on six selected
health service functions, which we defined as broad cat-
egories of tasks that involve decision-making for health
services. These functions were drawn from the inter-
views following a deductive approach and grouped into
the following categories:
 Planning – development by the local health board
or committee of plans for health services, including
deciding which needs to prioritize and address;
 Health financing – determining the
budget allocation for local health services, including
the sources of funds and how to spend the budget;
 Resource management – making decisions on the
construction of new (or renovation of existing) local
health facilities, including the procurement and
maintenance of equipment and supplies (e.g.
medicines) to make such facilities functional (Note:
in the Philippines, these local health facilities are
owned and managed by local governments, such as
the provincial and district hospitals which are under
the provinces and the primary care facilities called
“Rural Health Units” or RHUs which are under the
municipalities; cities may own both hospitals and
RHUs);
 Human resources for health – hiring and firing of
local health staff, including making decisions related
to supporting their training and providing the range
of benefits that they are entitled to;
 Health service delivery – deciding what range of
health programs (e.g. maternal and child health
program, reproductive health program) and services
(e.g. immunization, TB-DOTS) will be made avail-
able in local health facilities;
 Data management and monitoring – deciding which
indicators to collect and how to use the data for
monitoring the performance of local health services.
Quantitative analysis involved visualizing the trends in
the survey responses through the use of radar charts in
Microsoft Excel 2016. To triangulate survey findings, we
brought in the themes from the qualitative analysis of
the in-depth interviews, which was performed in
MAXQDA Standard 12 (VERBI GmbH Berlin 2018).
We reviewed the interview transcripts to identify illus-
trative quotes that may explain the results of the online
survey.
Results
Study participants
There were 17 male and 10 female participants in the
in-depth interviews with an average of 24 years of service
in the government sector in various locations across the
Philippines [18]. There were 22 medical doctors, three
lawyers, and two non-health professionals. Most were
local government health officers (11/27) and DOH staff
serving in various capacities (10/27), and the rest were
politicians (6/27). As the goal of qualitative research is a
deeper understanding of participants’ insights and their
context, purposive selection that obtained a wide
Fig. 1 Number of respondents for the mixed methods study. Legend: a – Profiles of interviewees are available in Liwanag and Wyss [18]. b – DMOs
are DOH staff who liaise with the local governments to advocate for the attainment of health objectives and provide technical assistance [27]; PHAs
are DOH staff deployed to local governments to assist primarily in data collection [28]; NDP nurses [29] and DTTB medical doctors [30] are DOH-hired
staff who are deployed to local health facilities to provide services and augment the local governments’ lack of human resources
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variation in the profiles of participants rather than statis-
tical representation was the sampling approach [31].
On the other hand, there were 14 female and 10 male
online survey participants with an average of 14 years of
serving in government. There were 12/24 nurses, 10/24
medical doctors, and 2/24 non-health professionals.
Mapping their work locations suggested a good coverage
of local settings in the region of Northern Luzon. Some
survey respondents had the responsibility for multiple
local governments, which explains why there were > 24
locations plotted on the map (Fig. 2).
Most survey respondents were DOH staff deployed to
the local governments in the region (15/24), followed by
local government health officers (7/24), while two were
local politicians (Fig. 1). Consequently, in our discussion
of results below, we would interpret survey results as a
reflection of the perspectives mainly of DOH staff and
local health officers and less of politicians. The anon-
ymized dataset of survey responses is also available as an
online supplement (see Additional file 2).
Perspectives on devolution
When asked about the benefits of devolution to health
services, more than half (13/24) of survey respondents
answered “empowerment of local governments to decide
for themselves and address their own health needs.” On
Fig. 2 Work locations of the survey respondents in Northern Luzon, Philippines. (Map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0. Data by
OpenStreetMap, under ODbL)
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the other hand, their responses to the challenges in
implementing devolution were more varied, such that 6/
24 answered “decisions related to local health services
have become politicized rather than evidence-based,” an-
other 6/24 answered “local governments have continued
to depend on assistance from the DOH,” and 5/24 an-
swered “local health workers’ full range of compensation
and benefits has not been provided consistently.”
Political vs. technical decision-maker
Visualizing the responses on radar charts for the six
functions revealed that most survey participants per-
ceived decision-making to be currently influenced by the
local politician (i.e. the provincial governor or munici-
pal/city mayor has the wide decision space), but would
rather have the local health manager (i.e. provincial, mu-
nicipal, or city health officer) to influence decision-
making for the functions instead. This preference to shift
the decision space away from the local politician in favor
of the local health officer was consistent in five functions
(Fig. 3). Illustrative quotes from the interviews were pro-
vided for each function below to shed some light on the
potential reasons on why survey respondents expressed
this preference.
Planning
Survey respondents perceived the governor or mayor to
have the most influence over decisions related to plan-
ning, yet most of them would prefer the health officer to
influence the decisions for this function instead.
Decision-making in planning relies on the participation
of the governor or mayor to chair the meeting of the
Local Health Board (LHB) where local health plans are
discussed and approved. The interviews revealed difficul-
ties in meeting regularly to plan together due to a lack
Fig. 3 Decision-makers who were perceived to be influencing decision-making for the various functions of local health services
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of interest from the local politician, as illustrated by the
following quote.
“Our LHB is not really functional because we would
set a meeting and the mayor is not around, although
it is possible for somebody else to be the presider.
But of course, what we want is for the mayor to be
there because once he calls for it, the other members
really participate.” – City health officer in a highly-
urbanized city, 32 years in government.
Health financing
In health financing, survey respondents also identified
the governor or mayor to be mostly influencing the deci-
sions, yet would similarly prefer the health officer to in-
fluence the decisions for this function instead. The
governor or mayor currently has the authority to ap-
prove the local government budget allocation for health
services upon the recommendation of the health officer.
However, the interviews indicated several instances
when the health officer’s desired budget is not approved
by the governor or mayor who may choose to prioritize
other needs.
“Before devolution, we were all health workers
[under the DOH] and shared the same thinking and
understood the mandate of a hospital, which is to
serve the people. But now, the finance staff in my
local government have a different outlook. They are
more into saving money. I have to exert effort to con-
vince them to fund our health programs. My deci-
sions pass through the governor, and I need to
convince him. Whereas, before devolution, as chief of
the hospital I had the autonomy, I could already de-
cide what to do with the money.” – Provincial health
officer in a low-income province, 29 years in
government.
Nevertheless, limitations in local budget allocations
could be addressed through financial augmentation from
the national social health insurance program, which is
managed by PhilHealth. An example of how this may be
done was illustrated by the following:
“In 2000, I had an annual budget of 300,000 pesos
[USD ~6,000] for the entire municipality with a
population of 9,000. The Sangguniang Bayan [town
council] could not give us additional budget. What
did I do? Instead of using the budget for medicines, I
used it to enroll our constituents in PhilHealth at
the cost of 120 pesos [USD 2.40] per family per year
at that time. In return, PhilHealth would pay a
capitation fund of 300 pesos [USD 6] per family. So
around 180 pesos [USD 3.60] per family was
returned to the local government as income. Instead
of having 300,000 pesos, my budget increased to
around 600,000 pesos, and we could use some of
that to buy medicines too.” – Municipal health offi-
cer in a low-income municipality, 17 years in
government.
Resource management
Decisions in resource management were also seen to be
influenced the most by the governor or mayor according
to survey respondents, but still preferred the health offi-
cer to influence the decisions instead. While the health
officer is responsible for the maintenance and upgrade
of local health facilities, including the equipment and
supplies (e.g. medicines) needed therein, final decisions
regarding these are made by the governor or mayor. The
interviews revealed situations where the health officer
would disagree with the governor or mayor and thus re-
ceive little local government support for resource
management.
“Every time I support a candidate during the elec-
tions, a different one wins as mayor. That is why all
the improvements in our RHUs come from assistance
from the central government through HFEP [Health
Facilities Enhancement Program], and none from my
local government. I once asked my mayor bluntly,
‘Mayor, why are you squeezing me? Why can’t we
have a good relationship?’ It’s difficult. He’s always
saying yes to me, but on the contrary, he is not giving
support for facilities.” – Municipal health officer in a
middle-income municipality, 28 years in government.
This same health officer, however, also explained that
challenges in infrastructure could be addressed with the
support provided by the central government, as he illus-
trated further:
“Through HFEP, I submit a proposal to the DOH.
Low-income municipalities are prioritized in HFEP.
I requested for a maternity and lying-in facility,
which the DOH constructed for us. It’s not only the
building, but we’re also given the equipment, like the
delivery table. If my local government could not pro-
vide for the facilities, then I make proposals through
HFEP.”
Human resources for health
In the management of human resources for health, the
governor or mayor was also identified to be mostly influ-
encing the decisions, yet the health officer was preferred
by survey respondents. Currently, the governor or mayor
has the final say on the appointment of local govern-
ment health staff. The interviews revealed situations
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where the governor or mayor would decide on hiring
based on political considerations rather than the qualifi-
cations of applicants.
“I don’t always get the right person for the right job.
When it comes to hiring, it’s still the governor who
has the final say. Of course, there is patronage, who-
ever is close to the governor, whoever will be able to
add to his votes, that’s the person who gets hired. I
usually get consulted in hiring the professionals, for
example, laboratory staff, or the positions with
supervisory roles. But for the rank and file positions,
it’s the governor who decides. These people however
should also be capable. We should not just hire any-
body who knows nothing.” – Provincial health officer
in a low-income province, 29 years in government.
Health service delivery
Decisions in health service delivery were likewise per-
ceived by survey respondents to be mostly influenced by
the governor or mayor yet the health officer was the pre-
ferred decision-maker. While the health officer can
propose health programs or services to be implemented
in the locality, these will require the approval of the gov-
ernor or mayor. The interviews revealed a tendency for
the governor/mayor to support only those programs that
result in political gains.
“My mayor was not supportive of my anti-smoking
initiative. In fact, he did not like it because he said
that people will get mad, the stores will be mad. But
I was able to convince him because I told him that
he will get an award for this, that he will be recog-
nized. So he supported it, not because he was think-
ing that disease can be prevented, but because he
wants to get the award. But politicians are like that,
they are for recognition, never mind the impact.” –
Municipal health officer in a low-income municipal-
ity, 16 years in government.
Data management and monitoring
On the other hand, survey respondents perceived the
health officer to be influencing the decisions in data
management and monitoring and would also prefer the
health officer to have a wide decision space for this func-
tion. The health officer is responsible for the timely and
accurate collection of data in the locality, which are then
pooled at provincial, regional, and central levels through
coordination with the DOH offices at various levels. As
illustrated below, the interviews did not indicate interfer-
ence by politicians in data management and monitoring,
which may explain the lack of divergence between
current and preferred decision-maker for this function.
“Our data are updated, partly-paper and partly-
electronic. We submit our reports to the DOH
through the public health associates. Because gather-
ing the data is important, we make sure that every
pregnant woman is monitored at the level of the
Barangay (village). We also know the indicators
where we are lagging behind.” – Municipal health
officer in a low-income municipality, 17 years in
government.
Preferences for governance structure
Responses to the question on the structure of govern-
ance revealed that most survey participants (18/24)
would consider various options for re-centralization
should they be able change the situation. At least half of
survey participants (12/24) preferred the most extreme
option of re-centralizing the entire system where the
central government would recover ownership and man-
agement of local government health facilities and staff
(Fig. 4).
Those who preferred maintaining devolution explained
that “the potential gains from devolution still outweigh
the existing problems and inefficiencies,” and that “major-
ity [of local governments] are supportive of the national
health thrust especially if these are well promoted and
explained by DOH representatives [i.e. DMOs].” When
asked what could improve the current devolved system,
one responded with “enlightening and empowering the
local politicians about their respective health situations,”
and another answered that “the DOH devolved the
personnel, facilities, and equipment but not the budget
for MOOE [maintenance and other operating expenses]”
and that the DOH should also transfer this budget to
the local governments.
Conversely, the expressed preference to re-centralize
government health services could be explained by the
discontent among local health managers which stemmed
from the inconsistency of benefits for local government
human resources for health and the politicization in
their management. Examples of human resources issues
cited by survey respondents as their reasons for their de-
sire to re-centralize include:
“So that all the benefits will be given to the health
personnel and their supervision will be under the
DOH and not influenced by politics.” – Municipal
health officer, 28 years in government.
“So that hiring of staff will be based on the qualifica-
tions and not on who they know in government.” –
DOH public health associate, 1 year in government.
“Too much politicking in the local government.
Health workers are being demoralized as benefits
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like hazard pay are not being given.” – Municipal
health officer, 26 years in government.
“Some benefits are not approved due to reasons that
the local government has no budget and the compen-
sation for municipal staff is far lower compared to
staff at the central level, yet local staff do have over-
loaded designations added to their work.” – DOH
nurse deployed to the local government, 9 years in
government.
The other explanation provided by survey participants
for their preference to re-centralize was what they per-
ceived as overdependence on central support, as illus-
trated by the following answers:
“The main source of medicines, vaccines, trainings
and augmentation of human resources is the DOH,
but the direction of local health services is controlled
by the local politician. With full re-centralization of
the health system… the resources from DOH will be
maximized and used according to their purpose…
There will be systematic and organized mobilization
of resources.” – DOH development management offi-
cer, 22 years in government.
“Since local governments depend a lot on the DOH
augmentation, I would rather prefer the entire sys-
tem to be re-centralized so that all the needs of gov-
ernment health facilities will be provided, including
the benefits and incentives of their human re-
sources.” – DOH development management officer,
33 years in government.
In contrast, the following quote from our interview
with a former provincial governor may also offer the
perspective of a political decision-maker:
“[Re-centralization] will be a retrogression because it
would run counter to the philosophy that decisions
are best made at the local level as they are the ones
down there who know the problem… So, empower
the local governments. If the central government con-
tinues to be the source of programs and funding, we
will not be able to develop the local communities
and the local leaders… Health is a basic service that
the local governments must provide, unless the local
governments cannot be trusted to take care of it. But
that’s a centralist point of view, and untrusting of
the people’s potential to take care of themselves.” –
Former provincial governor, 17 years in government.
Discussion
The objective of this study was to analyze decision-
makers’ perspectives and preferences on who should be
making decisions for the functions of health services at
local levels and on their preferred structure of govern-
ance, and explored potential reasons for their prefer-
ences. While decentralization is a complex process that
is often difficult to assess [32], unpacking it according to
the functions that involved decision-making would be a
useful step in analyzing it. Indeed, it would be inad-
equate to discuss decentralization or devolution only in
broad terms. It would rather be meaningful to recognize
that local level decision-making involves multiple actors
in practice and figure out who among such actors would
Fig. 4 Survey participants who preferred maintaining the current devolved structure of governance and those who preferred various options
for re-centralization
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be in a better position to use the decision space granted
by decentralization.
In other decentralized settings, discontent among hu-
man resources for health due to their lack of compensa-
tion and benefits in the wake of devolution has also been
reported, such as in local governments’ failure to pay for
the salaries of local health managers in Nigeria [33]. A
review of case studies in several countries has also re-
ported on how central employees got compensated dif-
ferently from decentralized employees, and yet equitable
remuneration is important for motivating health staff
[34]. In decentralization, it is therefore paramount to
consider health workers’ satisfaction as one of the poten-
tial indicators of effectiveness.
Dependence on central level support in
decentralization has similarly been reported in
Indonesia, an archipelago like the Philippines, where
many functions have been transferred to local levels, but
only those localities with revenues available from their
own sources fared well in performing the functions [35].
Thus, like in the Philippines, the central government in
Indonesia supports many local governments with grants,
which increased their reliance on central support [36].
The preference to shift decision-making away from the
local politician and more towards the local health officer
was likely influenced by the expectation among survey
respondents that the shift would rectify the perceived
politicization in decision-making for the functions and
the continued reliance on central support. The illustra-
tive quotes from the interviews above showed examples
of difficulties in upgrading facilities (resource manage-
ment), hiring the qualified people for the job (human re-
sources for health), and implementing initiatives for
health promotion (health service delivery) when final de-
cisions had to be made by the governor or mayor and
not by the local health officer who had the technical
capacity for these functions. The quotes further illus-
trated challenges in planning and financing when the
local politician was either disinterested or not prioritiz-
ing health services. Hereby it was evident that
decentralization could be challenging when political and
technical decision-making were mixed. Supervision and
management of local health services would certainly re-
quire technical knowhow and may be better left to the
purview of those with training for and appreciation of
public health services. Yet the way decentralization was
carried out in the Philippines granted decision-making
authority for most functions to the local politician, who
may not always have the best interests of public health
in mind.
Previous studies on devolution in the Philippines have
already reported on the common tension between the
local health officer and the local politician [37], or how
the local politicians’ decisions were driven by their desire
to get re-elected in office [38] yet continued to have sub-
stantial discretion in planning and budgeting for health
services [39] and had a tendency to invest in tangible
projects rather than support capacity building and sys-
tem improvement [40]. Such observations in the
Philippines are not unique. Other studies have likewise
reported on how, for example, tribal affiliations rather
than qualifications influenced the hiring of staff by local
governments in Kenya [41], or how decisions for local
health services in Indonesia and Kenya were made based
on their appeal to the electorate [42, 43], or how polit-
ical interference in health planning in Tanzania led to a
complex relationship between the local politician and
the local government technocrat [44].
Data management and monitoring, unlike the other
functions, often did not involve the exercise of wielding
power to increase electability in office, benefits which
would often attract the interest of politicians. This may
potentially explain why this study indicated that the
current and desired decision-maker for this function was
the same (i.e. the local health officer). A previous
comprehensive study on decentralization of health
information system in Tanzania, for example, did not
report political interference in data management as a
concern [45].
The preference for re-centralization in this study
would appear inconsistent with the more common
desire to expand decentralization even further in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs). In Kenya, a
country with a much younger history of devolution since
2013, one study described how devolution ironically de-
creased local level decision space and recommended
transferring more autonomy to county hospitals [46].
Other studies likewise reported a preference to expand
decentralization by increasing capacities in Tanzania
[47] and India [17], and by widening local decision space
further for human resources management in Ghana [48]
and Uganda [13], and for several functions in Fiji [16].
Why do our findings seem to contrast with the com-
mon desire for further decentralization in LMICs? First,
it’s important to highlight that the perspectives
expressed by study participants have drawn from a much
longer history of devolution in the Philippines (~ 25
years). Second, given this long history, we postulate that
local decision-makers may have somewhat lost their op-
timism that the devolved governance would still achieve
the promise of health sector reform. This frustration
with the system, driven by their perceived politicization
of decision-making and the dependence of local govern-
ments on central augmentation may have led to their
preference to re-centralize the system. It is, however, un-
certain if re-centralization would solve the problems of
politicization and overreliance on central support. If
there is one thing to learn about decentralization, it is
Liwanag and Wyss BMC Health Services Research          (2020) 20:305 Page 10 of 13
the realization that changing the structure of governance
would not improve the health system unless certain con-
ditions are met [18]. One such condition is strengthen-
ing both the supportive and regulatory roles of the
central decision-maker (e.g. Ministry of Health) in assist-
ing local governments to deliver quality health services,
and in holding them accountable for meeting the targets
set for the health system.
The phenomenon where devolution led to the concen-
tration of power with politicians rather than truly bring
decision-making closer to people has been called elite
capture [49]. In Kenya, for example, the rapid transition
to devolution led to a lack of clarity of roles and mistrust
between health system actors, which allowed decision-
making to be captured by local elites who favored polit-
ical interests and populist priorities rather than genuine
health needs [50]. A study in Pakistan suggested that, in
order to manage political interference, the central minis-
try ought to deliver new roles in order to build consen-
sus in the system and safeguard against local political
pressures [51]. In relation to our findings, this would
imply that the central level in the Philippines ought to
continue supporting local governments but also take it
upon itself the duty to promote and protect the rights
and privileges of local human resources for health.
Therefore, rather than re-centralize the Philippine health
system—a change so radical that it would likely be
politically-difficult to pursue—a policy option for consid-
eration would be to maintain devolution but minimize
politicization in decision-making. This could be achieved
if the central level would further incentivize local gov-
ernments’ satisfactory management of their human re-
sources for health, and likewise further regulate
decision-making for the various functions by including a
positive assessment of performance in these functions as
a condition in its licensing and accreditation of local
government health facilities (i.e. a “carrot and stick” ap-
proach). In other words, it would be a decentralized or
devolved system but with a revitalized central role for
oversight and regulation, such that local politicians
would still perform decision-making for the functions of
local health services, but their decisions would be kept
in check by a competent local health officer protected by
the central government, as well as by the incentives and
regulatory mechanisms imposed in the system by the
central government to ensure good decision-making
across the functions.
Limitations
Albeit several reminders were sent, the response rate
from the online survey was unsatisfactorily low. This is a
limitation of the study which also suggests that we do
not have the full picture of decision-makers’ perspectives
in the Philippines. Possible reasons for the low response
rate may include limited access to the internet in certain
areas, the lack of time for potential respondents to
consult and respond to their emails given their heavy
workload, or simply the lack of interest from certain
decision-makers to participate. Local politicians were
under-represented despite this study having been en-
dorsed by the DOH regional office. Further studies may
therefore consider implementing the survey via phone
calls, or even face-to-face, as this might increase the re-
sponse rate, although such will require more time and
resources, while accessing politicians and getting them
to participate is often easier said than done. Expanding
from this study, it would be interesting to see if subse-
quent and larger surveys would reveal a different pattern
of preferences should more politicians participate as
they, we hypothesize, might likely express a desire to
maintain devolution.
Conclusion
Decentralization is a process which several countries
have chosen to undertake. The fact that decision-making
authority now belongs to local levels after
decentralization or devolution may be a desired outcome
in itself. However, as suggested by our study in the
Philippines, this transfer does not necessarily ensure that
effective decisions for local health services are made. Ra-
ther than re-centralize, a policy option for the
Philippines includes emphasizing the role of the central
government in exercising its regulatory oversight over
local governments to minimize political interference in
decision-making and to protect the welfare of local gov-
ernment technical staff.
Decentralization or devolution of health services,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, must not only
be satisfied with the outcome that local levels have been
granted the space to make decisions for themselves.
Given the many actors at local levels, who should decide
for health services? Pursue decentralization indeed—but
it’s critical to ensure that those who were granted with
the decision space actually make decisions for the vari-
ous functions with adequate capacities and are able to
grasp the importance of health services.
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